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ABSTRACT
Techniques to deliver privacy-preserving synthetic datasets
take a sensitive dataset as input and produce a similar dataset
as output while maintaining differential privacy. These ap-
proaches have the potential to improve data sharing and
reuse, but they must be accessible to non-experts and toler-
ant of realistic data. Existing approaches make an implicit
assumption that the active domain of the dataset is similar to
the global domain, potentially violating differential privacy.
In this paper, we present an algorithm for generating dif-
ferentially private synthetic data over the large, weakly con-
strained domains we find in realistic open data situations.
Our algorithm models the unrepresented domain analyti-
cally as a probability distribution to adjust the output and
compute noise, avoiding the need to compute the full domain
explicitly. We formulate the tradeoff between privacy and
utility in terms of a “tolerance for randomness” parameter
that does not require users to inspect the data to set. Finally,
we show that the algorithm produces sensible results on real
datasets.
1 INTRODUCTION
We consider differential privacy mechanisms to produce
privacy-preserving synthetic datasets from real datasets with-
out making any assumptions about the domain from which
the original dataset is drawn. Our motivation is open data
sharing situations, where the data publisher is typically not
the data owner and therefore cannot make assertions about
how the data was collected.
Consider, for example, a survey that prompts users to enter
their gender in a free-text field. After collecting a sufficient
number of responses, the data collector passes the to the
data publisher for privatization and release, who notices
that every response is either male or female. She models
the distribution appropriately using one of several existing
methods [1, 4, 5], and creates synthetic data with gender
values of male and femalewith zero probability of any other
response. But a single respondent entering genderqueer as
their response violates the differential privacy.
One solution is to ask the data provider to constrain the
domain, but this approach changes the nature of the survey.
Another solution is to refuse to release data in this setting,
citing the inapplicability of differential privacy. But this fail-
ure seems unsatisfying, as it would typically be acceptable to
just ignore the rare values and still release something useful.
In this paper, we consider the problem of deciding on an
appropriate threshold for rare values, which turns out to be
a subtle issue.
The approach we take involves sampling from differen-
tially private histograms; a survey by Meng et al summarizes
the many solutions to this problem [3]. However, when pro-
ducing synthetic data, the histogram cannot be modeled as
a parallel set of differentially private count queries, one for
each bin. Any possible count query over the whole domain
could potentially be asked by a user, so we essentially need
an extremely large number of bins. We show that any mech-
anism must include bins from outside the active domain
with non-zero probability to preserve differential privacy
(Theorem 2.2).
Our solution is to allow a (potentially large) domain for
the attribute being modeled, and replace low-count bins
with “random” bins with some probability. We explore the
relationship between the domain size and this probability of
including unrealistically “random” values and domain size
to empower the publisher to tailor their mechanism without
inspecting the data.
We do not disallow the data publisher from making a con-
servative guess about the true domain under this approach. A
poor guess will only impact utility, not privacy. For example,
a data publisher who sees an attribute labeled gender may
simply assert that the domain only includes male and female.
Privacy is preserved, and utility may be acceptable. However,
this assertion would exclude any other values, significantly
impacting utility. On the other hand, the data publisher may
decide that any English word might be valid. This decision
would allow for synthetic data outside of the male/female
binary, but the size of the domain means that there is more
likely to be considerable noise negatively impacting utility.
The only thing we want to discourage is mechanizing your
“guess” as just equivalent to the active domain.
In the remainder of this short paper, we prove a simple
theorem that motivates our approach, then formulate an al-
gorithm that is a) efficient for large domains and b) allows
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control over the probability of including values from outside
the active domain. We then show that this algorithm pro-
duces sensible results on real data with no data-dependent
input from the user.
2 BAD BINS THEOREM
We show the impossibility of producing DP synthetic data
that includes only values from the active domain. We begin
with a Lemma:
Lemma 2.1. Given a differentially private mechanismq with
respect to a set of database instances D of schema R(A), if
P[q(Di ) = r ] = 0 for some database instance Di and a result r ,
then P[q(D) = r ] = 0 for all D ∈ D.
Proof. Let P[q(Di ) = r ] = 0 for some database instance
Di and result r . For any database instance D j ∈ D, define a
sequence of database instances S(D j ,Di ) = {D1,D2, . . . ,Dn}
such that D1 = Di , Dn = D j , and Dk and Dk+1 are neighbors
for all 0 ≤ k < n. 1 It follows that
P[q(D j ) = r ] ≤ eϵ × P[q(D2) = r ]
≤ e2ϵ × P[q(D3) = r ]
...
≤ e(n−1)ϵ × P[q(Di ) = r ]
≤ 0
Since the probability cannot be less than 0, we find that
P[q(D) = r ] = 0 for all D ∈ D □
Theorem 2.2. There does not exist a differentially private
mechanism that only returns elements from the active domain.
Intuition: There must be a non-zero chance of returning
every element in the global domain, or else Lemma 2.1 is
violated.
Proof. Let D be the set of possible database instances.
Let c be a function such that c(D) returns the active domain
of D. Let c∗ be some differentially private mechanism that
returns a value set c∗(D) ⊆ c(D). This means that c∗ can be
probabilistic, but only the value sets in the powerset of c(D)
have non-zero probabilities. Next let us pick some Di ∈ D.
Then P[q(Di ) = r ] = 0 for all r ⊈ c(Di ), and additionally by
Lemma 2.1 that P[q(D) = r ] = 0 for all D ∈ D. This holds
true for all c(D), and thus the possible range R of c∗(D) is con-
strained by R = ∩D∈Dc(D) = ∅. Therefore, our mechanism
c∗ must be the trivial one that returns the empty set. □
Examining the proof of Theorem 2.2, we note that it de-
pends crucially on the choice of function c . If we allow this
function to be defined on a pre-defined domain outside of the
1Two datasets are neighbors if they differ in the presence or absence of a
single record, following the differential privacy definition.
Figure 1: Illustration of how the true values of a long-
tailed distribution (dark bars) can be obscured or ex-
cluded by the noise-induced bins of Algorithm 1 (light
bars).
active domain found in the database instance D, this range
constraint no longer holds and the mechanism can in fact be
differentially private. This observation is the motivation for
the categorical method outlined in the next section.
3 ALGORITHM
In this section we establish a differentially private algorithm
for categorical (discrete) data given a constrained domain.
The algorithm allows the data publisher to act unilaterally
to produce a synthetic dataset with strong guarantees about
privacy even when only very weak assumptions can be made
about the domain, and even when these assumptions may
be wrong.
To illustrate the ideas, we will refer to the case of a single
string attribute A with a small active domain adom(A) but
with a global domain dom(A) of all possible alphanumeric
strings. Our task is to select the bins we will include in the
histogram. Once we have the bins, we can add Laplace noise
to their counts or use any other appropriate mechanism; we
are not concerned with that step.
One way to select the bins for the histogram is to use the
exponential mechanism: sort the bins by their counts, and
select k bins with exponentially decaying probability pro-
portional to their count. However, repeated execution of this
mechanism requires repeatedly splitting the privacy budget,
and would require specifying k . But setting k appropriately
requires inspecting the active domain.
Another approach is to use the Laplace mechanism by
adding noise to every bin in the global domain. Besides be-
ing computationally infeasible, this approach would cause
utility to vanish. About half of the categories outside of the
active domain would receive a positive weight due to the
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symmetry of Laplace noise, producing an enormous number
of seemingly random bins. For a sufficiently large domain,
the probability density of these random bins would outweigh
the probability density of the categories found in the active
domain.
We could address this issue by only including those cat-
egories with noisy counts that exceed a threshold τ . The
larger this threshold is, the less likely we are to include any
given category from outside the active domain. But setting
τ appropriately requires inspecting the active domain: If it
is set too high, rare values will not appear in the synthetic
dataset. If it is set too low, there will be a high number of
bins with random labels.
Instead, we express τ in terms of a tolerance for random
values, a parameter which could potentially be set as a global
policy across all datasets.
To express this tolerance, we model each bin outside of the
active domain as a binary trial, where each bin is included
with probability p equal to the probability that the Laplace
noise exceeds the threshold τ . Assuming that τ ≥ 0, this con-
straint means that p = 12e
−ϵτ . Therefore we can sample from
this binomial distribution over n trials to find the number of
categories to include from outside the active domain, where
n is the size of the global domain. Let B(k,n,p) represent the
Binomial probability of k successes on n trials with probabil-
ity p. This expression overestimates the probability slightly,
as the categories in the active domain are already accounted
for. Using this relationship we can define a probability ρ of
including zero categories from outside the active domain:
ρ = B(0,n,p) = (1 − 12e−ϵτ )n .
We can set ρ to any appropriate value and solve for the
noisy threshold τ in terms of the other parameters, resulting
in the relation τ = − 1ϵ ln[2(1 − ρ
1
n )]. Because this expression
is derived from the assumption that τ ≥ 0, the relationship
only holds when ρ 1n ≥ 12 . However, for any sizable value of
n we note that ρ 1n ≫ 12 so this relationship holds in general.
By viewing this process as binomial selection, we also
make the problem computationally feasible. We can analyti-
cally determine the number of bins k from outside the active
domain that will exceed the threshold τ . Let k = B(n,p) be
a random variable chosen from the binomial distribution
with n and p defined as before. Then we randomly sample k
categories from the global domain and give each a weight
sampled from the following probability distribution derived
from Bayes’ Theorem: P(x |x ≥ τ ) = P (x )P (x ≥τ = ϵe−ϵ (x−τ ),
which is simply an exponential distribution with λ = ϵ right-
shifted to τ . Modeling the inactive domain with a probability
distribution significantly reduces the computation necessary.
This procedure has the effect of replacing the original
distribution present in the data with a version of an expo-
nential distribution as a result of the nature of the Laplace
noise being added to each of the values from outside of the
active domain. This exponential distribution depends only
on the size of the domain and not the data in the database
instance D. For high values of τ , values in the tail of the
distribution may be excluded. But even for low values of τ ,
it becomes likely that random bins will have higher counts
than true bins, obscuring the true values. Figure 1 illustrates
the situation.
Algorithm 1 Categorical Histogram Method
Input: Size of the domain n, tolerance for values outside
the active domain ρ, privacy budget ϵ , and the true his-
togram (C , S) where C is a vector of categories in the
active domain and S is a vector of true frequencies for
each corresponding category in C .
Output: Differentially private histogram
1: procedure CatHist(n, ρ, ϵ,C, S)
2: τ ← − ln(2(1−ρ
1
n ))
ϵ
3: i ← 0
4: while i < |C | do
5: si ← Lap(si , 1ϵ )
6: if si < τ then Remove(ci , si )
7: i ← i + 1
8: k ← 12e−ϵτ ▷ Noisily select number of bins
9: j ← 0
10: while j < k do
11: Append(C , GetCategoryFromDomain())
12: Append(S , τ + ExpDist(ϵ))
13: j ← j + 1
return C, S
Algorithm 1 shows the full procedure for categorical his-
tograms. The algorithm accepts the size of the domain n, a
tolerance for values outside the active domain ρ, a privacy
budget ϵ and the true histogram (C, S) where C is a vector
of categories in the active domain and S is a vector of true
frequencies forC . The proof that Algorithm 1 is differentially
private follows from the definition of the Laplace mechanism,
and is omitted for space.
This algorithm has two parameters that can be varied to
control the tradeoff of privacy and pollution from the large
domain: ρ and ϵ . The ρ parameter bounds the probability
of including random values, and a low value increases the
utility of the dataset for collaborators. However, a high ρ will
increase τ , and therefore require a dataset whose categories
have high support to produce useful results.
4 EXPERIMENTS
In order to evaluate the behavior of Algorithm 1, we run it
on attributes from the UCI Adult dataset [2]. We specifically
investigate whether or not CatHist generates sensible results.
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Figure 2: Fidelity results for categorical data over varying ρ and ϵ values
Evaluation Metric: A natural choice of metric is to eval-
uate the accuracy of some randomized query on the output
as compared to that of the original data. However, random
queries over the full domain would be mostly zero in both
the true data and the synthetic data. Instead we measure the
fidelity of the results with respect to the categories present in
the active domain. We define this metric F to be the product
of the probability densities of the true distribution and the
results of Algorithm 1 over the intersection of the category
sets. Thus F = 1 if the category sets are equivalent, and
F = 0 if the intersection of the two is the empty set. Note
that approaches that include all of the categories in the active
domain will have a fidelity F = 1 by definition (but suffer
privacy concerns).
Experiment: The sex, workclass, and marital-status
fields from the Adult dataset are investigated in our experi-
ment. The domain of sex was taken to be all English words
(size 1.71×105), while workclass and marital-statuswere
run over all English word pairs (size 2.94 × 1010). Algorithm
1 returns a category set C altered from the active domain.
We ran Algorithm 1 over each of these categories 100
times for varying values of ϵ and ρ, and report the average
F score for each in Figure 6. As a general trend, we find that
increasing ρ increases the fidelity of the result, except for the
workclass attribute when ϵ = 0.01. This increase is a result
of the fact that workclass is the longest-tailed distribution
of the three we are observing, and for high ρ values we are
setting the threshold prohibitively high and obscuring most
of the results in this tail. For higher ϵ values, the threshold
is set low enough to include categories from this long tail,
eliminating the behavior.
Another observation is that the fidelity for sex is con-
sistently higher than that of the other two attributes. This
increase is a result of the fact that the counts are distributed
between two high-support attributes and that the specified
domain size is much smaller. We can therefore choose thresh-
olds well below the true support for the less common at-
tribute value, leading to near-100% preservation of the at-
tribute structure for ρ = 0.9.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have shown the difficulty of meeting the
constraints of differential privacy as a data publisher when
the domain of data values is unknown, and presented a mech-
anism that allows for these constraints to be met when gen-
erating synthetic data from a histogram. The data publisher
is free to assert any domain they wish (as long as it is not
simply the active domain) and the results published using
our method will be differentially private. Utility suffers if the
global domain is too large or a subset of the active domain.
If the choice of global domain is similar to the active domain,
then our approach converges to that of traditional methods.
Our approach adds an additional parameter to control the
sensitivity to random values, but this extra parameter does
not depend on the data. The privacy burden is therefore
shifted from the data publisher to the system itself: privacy
violations are impossible even if the data publisher has no
knowledge of data privacy and no knowledge of the input
data. Although utility can be poor for large domains or low
noise tolerances, we find that a synthetic dataset is always
at least minimally useful to communicate the structure and
types of the data to developers debugging new tools. Looking
forward, approaches to handle weakly constrained domains
can lead to tools that are easier to use for novices to facilitate
data sharing.
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